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In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
ARNIE R. GREEN,

Plaintiff and

App~llant,

-vs.THE LANG COMPANY, INC.,
a Corporation,
LEONARD CHIPMAN LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, a Corporation,
JULION CLAWSON, Sr., and
JULION CLAWSON, Jr.,
Defendants ,and Respondents.

Case No.
7262

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a case in which it has been judicially determined
that the plaintiff, by reason of certain personal injuries, has
been damaged in the sum of $3,030.00; but the plaintiff is
seeking to recover for those damag~s the sum of $4280.00.
The plaintiff brought this action-against the Lang Com,
pany, Inc., a corporation, Leonard Chipman Livestock
Company, a corporation, Julian Clawson, Sr., and Julian
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Clawson, Jr., and in his amended complaint alleged that his
injuries were due to the carelessness and neglig•ence of the
defendants as al1eged in paragraph 7 of his said amended
complaint (R. 14).
The defendants Leonard Chipman LiVIc8tJock Company
and the two Clawsons, by answer, denied their own negligenoe, but did not deny the negligence of the Lang Company,
the other defendant, and did not deny that the negligence
of the Lang Oompany proximaudy caused the injuries to the
plaintiff. Hence, as between these defendants and the plaintiff the11e was no issue as to the negligence of the Lang Company or as to the fact that such neglig·ence proximately
caused injuries to the plaintiff.

On the 7th day of June, 1948, the day before this. case
came to trial, the plaintiff and the Lang Company entered
into a covenant not to sue, whe11ein it was recited that
there had been some claim of liability on the part of the Lang
Company; that, the11efore, in consideration of the ..sum of
$1,250, the plaintiff promised and agreed not to sue the
Lang Oompany on any claim or claims of any description
for or on acoount of a:ny injuries receiVIed by plaintiff in the
accident wherein plaintiff was injured by reason of a tire
and wheel falling off the truck of these defendants. Plaintiff expP<3ssly reserved its rights against the defendant Livestock Company and the two Clawsons.
Pursuant to this agreement, the Court entered an order
dismissing the case as against the Lang Company (R. 34).
This cause proceeded to trial, with the Lang Company
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eliminated as a party. At the end of the presentation of
evidence, the covenant not to sue was submitted in evidence
by the parties hereto as Exhibit H (R. 114). The Trial
Court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
these defendants and found that the plaintiff had been dam,
aged in the sum of $3,030.00. (See paragraph 9, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 48). The Trial Court
further found that the plaintiff had received from the Lang
Company the sum of $1,250.00 in consideration for which
plaintiff agreed not tJo sue or prosecute the Lang Company
for any injuries _received in the accident involved in this
cause of action. The Court thereupon deducted the
$1,250.00 so received by the plaintiff and entered judgment
against the defendants Livestock Company and the two
Clawsons in the sum of $1780.00.
The plaintiff in this Court contends that the defendant
Lang Company and the defendants Livestock Company and
the two Clawsons were not joint tort feas~ors, that the Lang
Company was in no way responsible for the injuries suffered
by the plaintiff, and that, therefore, judgment should be
entered against the latter defendants for the entire amount
of plaintiff's damag~zs, and upon some theory left unstated,
plaintiff is entit1ed to pocket $1,250.00 in addition thereto.
Plaintiff's statement of the facts of the case is generally
oorrect and we will make such further statement of facts as
we deem nzcessary under each of the point·s we rely upon.

POINTS INVOLVED
To sustain the judgment as rendered by the Trial Court,
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the defendants Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, Julion
Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr., rely upon and present in opposition to plaintiff's oont,ention, the following
propositions:
I.
Where an inju11zd person files suit against two or more
pevsons alleging that their negligence caused his injuries, any
settlement mcrde by the injured person with one of the de£endants will be deducted from the amount of damages suffered by him, even though the defendant released was not
in fact liable.

II.
The pleadings and proof in this case support the finding
of the Trial Court that the Lang Company was negligent
and that its negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries, and that, hence, it was a joint vort feasor.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHERE AN INJURED PERSON FILES SUIT
AGAINST TWO OR MORE PERSONS ALLEGING
THAT THEIR NEGLIGENCE CAUSED HIS INJUR·
IES, ANY SETTLEMENT MADE BY THE INJURED
PERSON WITH ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS WILL
BE DEDUCTED FROM THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SUFFERED BY HIM, EVEN THOUGH THE
DEFENDANT RELEASED WAS NOT IN FACT
LIABLE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff should be entitled to but one satisfaction for
the damages suffered by him. A holding contrary to this
proposition would be inequitable and unju.st and would
permit an injured person to make money out of any injury
hz may suffer by fiiling suit or threatening to file suit against
varkms persons and thereby getting them to pay money for
injuries suffered, even though there was no liability upon
their part.
It is to be noted that it is not a contention of these
defendants, the Livestock Company and the two Clawsons,
that the payment of $1,250.00 to the plaintiff by the Lang
Company discharges these defendants. Their contention is
that the payment by the Lang Company, which was made
a party to this suit, is a pro tanvo discharge o£ these de£~nd..
ants, who are then liable only for the balance of the damages
suffered by the plaintiff. There is no discussion of this
proposition in Appellant's Brief, and \Ve submit that the law
sustains the proposition h~re asserted by these defendants.
Section 47.-0.-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides
as follows:

""The amount or value of any consideration
received by the obligee from one or more of several
obligors, or from one or more of joint or of joint and
sev~ral obligors, in who1e or in partial satisfaction of
their obligations shall be credited to the extent of the
amount received on the obligation by all co.-obligors
to whom the obligor or obligors giving the consider.
ation did not ·stanc.l in the relation of a surety."
By Section 47 .. 0.-1 the obligor includes a person liable
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for a tort; obligee includes a person having a right based
on tort.
Under this statute no distinction is made between re,
leases and covenants not to sue. At common law it was
early held that a discharge of one of two or more joint tort
fe,as~ors by release effected a discharge of the other joint
tort fea.stors. To lessen the supposed harshness of this rule
the courts began holding that where the injured person
entered into a covenant not to sue with one of two or more
tor.t feasors., ·such covenant not to sue would not result in
a release or discharge of the other joint tort feasors. However, it is wdl •established at common law that payments
made on account of such injuries, pursuant to the terms of
a covenant not to sue, are considered as pro tanto satisfaction
of damages recoverable against the other joint tort feasors.
(See annotation at 104 A.L.R. 931, the tide of which is
..Amount Paid by One Alleged Joint Tort Fetasoor in Consideration of a Covenant not to Sue, as pro ta:n~o Satisfaction
of Damages Recoverable against Other Joint Tort F.easors."

:~

:~

45 Am. fur. 677, Release Sec. 4 states the rule as
follows:
··An injured person can have but one satisfaction for his injuries; and theretore the amount paid
by the tort feasor, in whose favor the covenant not to
sue was given, will be regarded as satisfaction pro
tanto as to the joint tort feasors."

·:

See also Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 21 N. E.
2d, 1, 128 A.L.R. 682; Laurezi v. Vra.nizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806,
155 P. 2d 633 (1945); McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. 2d 659
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( 1943); 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 88'5.
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the application to this case of the
foregoing statute, and authorities, by a contention that the
Lang Company was in fact not liable to plaintiff at any time,
although p1aintiff alleged under oath that the Lang Company
was liable for such injuries, and although based upon that
claim of liability, plaintiff pocketed the sum of $1,2'50.00
paid to him by the Lang Company.
The courts have not looked with favor upon such 0011'
tention, and in over,ruling \Such contention, have asserted
that an injured person is entitled to but one satisfaction;
that it would be inequitable for a person to receive for his
injuries more compensation than the damages suffered, and
that such injured person will be estopped from asserting that
a person who paid him compensation for injuries was not in
fact liable therefor.
In Jacobsen v. WoeTner, 149 Kan. '598, 89 P. 2d 24
(1939), plaintiff- brought an action for personal injuries.
Plaintiff was a passenger in a bus of the Cardinal Stage
Lines. Defendant's truck was moving on the same ·sighway
as the bus, in the opposite direction, and in passing another
car went on to the left side of the highway, striking the
Stage Lines bus and injuring plaintiff. The plaintiff, in consideration of $2'50.00 paid by the Stage Lines, entered into
a covenant not to sue the Stage Lines. The covenant provided that the Stage Lines den!ed any negligence, and that
it wa·s desired by the parties to avoid litigation and the
expenses thereof, and that they desincd to set at rest the
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differences between them. Plaintiff saved all rights against
all others.
The jury found that the Stage Lines was not guilty
of negligence. The verdict was for the plaintiff against the
defendant, and the trial oourt refused oo allow any reduction
for the amount paid to plaintiff under the covenant not to
sue. This was held error.
The oourt stated that an injured party could receive
but one •satisfaction for the same injury; that a release of one
joint tJort feasor releases all, and that a covenant not to sue
one joint tort feasor does not release ·others.
After quoting from a number of cases, the Kansas
Supreme Court concludes:
""Whzn a right of action is once satisfied, it
ceases to exist. If part satisfaction has already been
obtained, further recovery can only be had of a sum
sufficient to accomplish satisfaction. It is not neoessary that the party making payment in partial satisfaction was in fact liable; anything received on
account of the injury inuv~s to the benefit of all and
operates as a payment pro tanto. The plaintiff is
entitled to only one satisfaction from whatev•er source
it may oome."
The court remanded the case with instructions to deduct
the $2 50.00 from the judgment 1entered.
Another leading case on this subject is the case of
T omp~ins v. Clay-street Hill R. Co., 66 Cal. 163, 4 P. 1165
( 1884) . In that case plaintiff commenced an action for
personal injuries resulting from a collision of the cars of the
Clay-street Hill Company and th2 Sutter-,street Company,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff being a passenger on the Sutter car. The complaint
alleged that both companies were negligent. The Sutter
Company paid the plaintiff and received a 11elease. The
Trial Court instructed the jury that if both companies w·ere
jointly at fault, then the verdict must be for the defendant,
because the payment to the Sutt>zr Company would release
the defendant Company; but that if only the defendant Com..
pany was at fault, then the verdict must be for the plaintiff.
This instruction was held to be erlior and the Court stated:
""It is urged by counsel for appellee that the
rule only applies where the money is paid by, or the
release executed to, one who is himself actually guilty
of the wrong or negligence. If it be oonceded that
a release to, or receipt of money in alleged satisfac..
tion from, one not himself a trespasser, will not
discharge those actually guilty, the question still
remains: Oan the plaintiff, under the circumstances,
be permitted ro deny that the Sutt>cr--street Railroad
Company was guilty of negligence directly contributing to the injuries by her received? ~eading the
release and stipulation in the 1.1coord, it is plain the
$550.00 was paid in settlement of the action pend.ing, in ·so far as the cause of action alleged oonsti.tuted a claim against the Sutter.-street Company.
The compromise of an asserozd claim does not neces.sarily involve an admission on the part of him against
whom the claim is asserted that the claim is well
founded. But one who, having commenced an action
against another, has receiv·ed money in consideration
that the action ·shall bz dismissed, or that any judg.ment he may recover shall not be enforced, ought not
to be permitted to deny that he received the money
in satisfaction of a valid demand. The defendant
paying the money may subsequently say: "I did not
and do not admit that I ought to have paid anything;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I was willing to buy my peace.' But the other party
ought not to be allowed to deny that he had any
right to the money, the payment of which he had
induo:d under pain of the prosecution of an action
al11zady commenced. He should not be permitted to
say, with any beneficial result to himself, "I pursued
the defendant falso clamore, and I took his money by
way of settlement of a pending action in which I
never oould have recovered.' Shall it be said that
plaintiff has not 11:ceived compensation for the injuries she sustained, because she did not choose affirmatively to prove that the negligence of the party from
whom she received the money contributed to the
injuries? The plaintiff must be held to have received
from the Sutter-street Compa:ny satisfaction for the
very same injuries for which she obtained a judgment
against the appellant."

A later California c~se considered this same proposition,
Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal App. 701, 268 P. 943 (1928).
In that case the plaintiff was in jured in an automobile collision. She was riding in a:n auto owned by Mrs. Emery and
driven by Mr. Emery. The other automobiLe was owned
by the defendant and was driven by his son. The plaintiff,
in consideration of $380.27, released Mrs. Emery. The
agreement provided that it was not to be construed as an
admi,ssion of liability by Mrs. Emery. The jury found that
the negligence of neither Mr. nor Mrs. Emery proximately
caused the negligence. The plaintiff contended that because
of this finding the ru1z as to release of one joint tort f.eas-or
was not applicable. The Court held that it was immaterial
that the Emerys were not liable and stated:
""Upon .this latter question the authorities are
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apparently not agreed, but, whatever may be the law
elsewhere, the rule seems tJo obtain in this state that
irrespective of the source from whom the compensa..
tion for the injury is accepted, the payment will
operate as a satisfaction, which in equity and good
conscience does not permit the party so compensated
to recover again for the same injury, the ground of
the rule being that the validity of the release is in no
way dependent upon the validity of the claim, and
therefore it is immaterial whether the pel!Son from
whom satisfaction came was or was not legally liable
* * * ; nor does it make any di:ffizrence however
small the compensation thus paid may have been
* * * . The bar arises not from· any particular
form that the proceeding assumes, but from the fact
that the injured party has actually received satisfac..
tion or what the law deems is the equivalent."
The Court further stated:

.. * * '* the application of the rule is based
upon the fundamental fact that, where there is a
single injury, there is but one cause of action, indi .
visible and inseparab1e, for which both in law and
good con~cience there can be but one •satisfaction. ,,
Later California cases have 11ecognized and followed
the same rule. See Drumm v. Hart, 136 Cal. App. 12, 27
P. 2d 945' (1933); Bkzc~burn v. McCoy, 1 Cal. App. 2d
64,37 P. 2d 15'3 (1934); Leff v. Knewbow, 47 Cal. App.
2d 360, 117 P. 2d 922 ( 1941).
In Snyder v. Mutual 'T e~ephone Company 135' Iowa 215'
112 N.W. 776, 14 L.R.A (N.S.) 321 (1907), plaintiff's
decedent was killed by coming in contact with a wire charged
with eLectricity. Plaintiff accepted $1,200.00 from the Des
Moines Electric Light Company in full settlement of any
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claim against that Company; she then filed suit against the
defendant Telephone Company. The jury was instructed
that if the Light Company and the defendant were joint
wrong doers, then their verdict must be for the defendant;
but that if the Light Company was not a wrong doer, then
the verdict must be for the plaintiff. The verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and on oppeal the foregoing
instruction was held err;oneous. The Court stated:
""The vice of this instruction is that it requires
the defendant to show as an affirmative fact, in order
to sustain the settlement pleaded by it, that the light
company was, as a matter of law a:nd fact, liable for
the injury. In other words, it requires the defendant
to make out against the light oompany just such a
cause of action as plaintiff would have been required
to make out if she had sued the light oompany for
the injury. Clearly this is not the law. The question
is whether the plaintiff had received satisfaction from
another of a claim for the same wrong-whether the
injury to the plaintiff has been satisfied. She should
not have two satisfactions. To sustain the rule announced by the instruction, it would be necessary to
hold that, although the plaintiff had sued the light
company and recove11ed judgment against it, which
judgment had been satisfied, she oould then have
sued this defendant and recovered another satisfaction if the jury in the second case had found that,
notwithstanding the judgm,ent against the light company, it wa:s, as a matter of fact, not liable for the
injury, for a judgment against one party is of no
binding effect in an action against another. This
question is practically determined by what is said in
Miller v. Bee~, 108 Iowa, 575, 582, 79 N.W. 344,
346, where this language is used: "As we have szen,
it is entirely immat•erial that the one from whom satSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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isfaction was demanded and received was not liable
for the entire damage. * * * A 'Satisfaction, how,
ever, by whomsoever made, if accepted as such, is
a bar to further proceedings on the same cause of
action., Whether or not this langugae was dictum
in the case in which it was used need not now be
discussed, for it is, \ve think, a sound statement ~f
the law."
In Seither v. Philadelphia 'Traction ·Company, 125 Pa.
St. 397, 17 A. 338, 11 Am. St. Rep. 905 (1889}, the
plaintiff was injured while riding in a car of the Peoples
Passenger Railway Company which collided with a car of
the defendant Traction Company. Plaintiff sued both com,
panies but settled with the Peoples Company for $6,000.00,
dismissing thz action against that Company, and plaintiff
then sought to recover for her injuries against the defendant
Traction Company.
The plaintiff contended that the Peoples Company was
not liable and therefore this release should have no affect
upon the liability of the def·endant Traction Company.
The Court said:
""The plaintiff had received one satisfaction; he
was not entitled to a second. In his suit against the
carrying company, the plaintiff could only hav'e re~
covered a verdict by showing that the collision was
caused by its negligence, in other words, that the
Peoples Company, and not the Traction Company,
was in fault. In the opening sentenoe of the printed
argum,ent in this case we find the following: "The
evidence offered by the plaintiff proves that while
riding in a car of the Pooples Company he was in~
jul\~d by a collision due entirely to the negligence of
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the Traction Cbmpany, thz carrying company and
its agents being absolutely without fault. At the
time this paragraph was written, the plaintiff had in
his pocket the sum of $6,000.00 which he had received from the Company which he now says was
"absolutely without fault.' A case so unique as this
might be supposed to stand alonz in the books."
In Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N.E. 107, the
plaintiff made a contention similar to that made in the case
at Bar, and the Court stated:
""The rule that a release of a cause of action to
one of several persons liable operates as a release to
all, applies to a relea·sz giv•en to one .against whom a
claim is made, although he may not be in fact liable.
The validity and effect of a release of a cause of
action does not depend on the validity of the cause
of action. If a claim is made against on~ and released,
all who may be liable are discharged, whether the
one released was liable or not."
In Young v. Ande'rson, 33 Id. 522, 196 P. 193, 50
A.L.R. 105 6, the defendant rented a horse and buggy from
the plaintiff. The horse and buggy was damaged and the
defendant injured when the horse apparently ran away upon
the approach of a car belonging to the Brosz Valley Traction
Company. Plaintiff sued to recover rent for the horse and
buggy and for damages while it was in the possession of the
defendant. The defendant counter--claimed for injudzs alleged to have resulted from a breach of warranty, that the
horse was gentle. It appeared during the trial that the d:::fendant had released the Traction Company £or injuries
received in oonsideration of $50.00. The Court held that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Boise Valley Traction Company was not in any sense
a joint tort f.easor and that the release was not a bar to the
counter claim of the defendant; but the Court did hold that
the payment of the $50.00 was admissible in evidence, and
in that connection stated:
"Since, however, appellant was only entitled
to receive compensation for his injuries received, the
consideration received from the Boise Valley Trac..
tion Company for the release of any claim against
it operated to reduce pro tanto the amount of any
damages he was entitLed ro recover against any other
tort feasor responsible for his injuries, and this is
true whether the tort feas.ors be joint or independent.
The release, therefore, was admissible in evidence.·,,
In Harris v. ·City of Roano~e, 179 Va. 1, 18 S.E. 2d
30 3 ( 1942), the plaintiff slipped on a substance on the street
and was injured. She demanded oompensation from a con..
tractor who was doing work at that point, the owner of the
building in front of which plaintiff •slipped and the lessees
thereof, and the city. She released all but the city for
$135.00. Plaintiff in that case asserted that the ones re..
leased were not joint tort feasors with the defendant city
a:nd therefore the city could not be released. The Court
over.-ruled this oontention and stated:

s
re~

~l

"It would be highly inequitable for the plaintiff
to be hzard to assert that the contracting firm and the
city were not joint tort feasors when her position, in
vie\V of the Pzlease, has been just the opposite.,,
In Cleveland etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417,
86 N.E. 48 5, 131 Am. St. &ep. 2 58 ( 1908), the plaintiff
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was a motorman of a street car which collided with a railroad car of the def1endant The defendant pleaded a release
from the street car company, signed by the defendant, releasing the street car company from all claims and demands
of the plaintiff arising out of the accident. The plaintiff
contended that the pleading setting forth this defense shows
that the street car company was not a joint tort feasor and
was not liable and does not show that a demand was made
for damages by the plaintiff against the street car company
and therefore this release had no effect upon defendant\s
liability. In over-ruling this contention, the Court said:
""With reference to the releasor and releasee, it
may be said that the Courts will not permit one
suffering a wrong to profit by the fears of those
occupying positions subjecting them to the suspicion
of being wrong-doer·s, and who are willing to buy
their peaoe rather than run a risk at law. One who
compromises a claim does not necessarily admit that
the claim was well founded, but the one who receives the consideration is precluded from denying
that it was. So it may be said that when a pretended
claim for a tort has been settled by treaty, and satisfaction rendered the claimant by one so connected
with the trespass as to be reasonably subject to an
action and possible liability as a joint tort feasor, the
satisfaction rendered will release all who may be
liable, whether the one released was liable or not. In
such a case it is not necessary that it should appear
that the party making the settLement was in fact
liable. It will be deemed ·sufficient if there is an
appearance of liability; that is, something in the nature of a claim on the one hand and a possible liability
under the ru~~es of law on the other."
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Under the rule annoWlced by the latter court, there
must be some appearance or possibility of liability on the
part of the person paying the injured party before paym,ent
by him will affect .the liability of others responsible for the
injuries. But in the case at bar this requirement is satisfied.
Plaintiff filed suit against Lang Company and the other de,
fendants alleging that the negligence of all defendants caused
plaintiff's injuries. Lang Company demurred to plaintiff's
Amended Complaint (R. 19, 20). This Demurrer was
overruled (R. 23). The trial court thereby 4eld that plain,
tiff had stated a cause of act~on against Lang Company.
Thi<S gave an appearance of liability and also indicated a
possibility of liability. In fact, there was such appearance
and possibility of liability that Lang Company was willing
to pay a substantial sum, $1,250.00, to settle the case. On
this matter of liability, see the discussion under Point II. of
this brief.
Other cCl!ses which support this contentiol) of these de,
fendants are Hubbard v. Railroad Oo., 173 Mo. 249, 72
S.W. 1073; Hartigan v. Dic~son, 81 Minn. 284, 83
N.W. 1091.
We submit that under the for·egoing authorities the
$1,250.00 receiVted by plaintiff from Lang Company must
be deducted from the total damages suffered by him, regard,
less of whether or not the Lang Company was in fact liable
for his injuries.
PoiNT II.
THE PLEADINGS AND PROOF IN THIS CASE
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SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE LANG COMPANY WAS NEGLIGENT
AND THAT ITS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES, AND
THAT, HENCE, IT WAS A JOINT TOR'T FEASOR.
Plaintiff contends that the Lang Company could not be
liable for plaintiff's injuries, and is not a joint tort feasor,
because of the following reasons:
1. The employees of the Lang Company in loading
the truck were acting outside of the scope of their employment and heno~ Lang Company cannot be held responsible
for their acts of commission or omission.
2. That Lang Company or its employees were not
negligent.
3. That if Lang Company was negligent, such negligence was not the pr;oximate cause of plaintiff's injurie~S,
because such n~gligenoe was only a remote cause and the
negligence of the defendant Livestock Company was an
intervening cause.

Plaintiff contends that the findings of the trial court,
contrary to· such contentions, are not supported by the
reoord. The obvious answ~r to these contentions is that
they are absolutely at variance with plaintiff's own pleadings
and the court, s findings are supported by the admitted or
undenied allegations in plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff alleged that Lang Company loaded the truck
and plao~d the wheel between the casings and cab of the
truck (R.13, 14). ThisthedefendantsLivcstockCompany
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and Clawsons admitted (R. 25). Under this state of the
pleadings the trial court could not find that the employees
of La:ng Company were not acting within the soope of their
employment. It was an admittzd fact that Lang Company
loaded the truck and placed the wheel thereon as alleged.
It was admitted by the pleadings that the wheel fell
from the truck and struck the plaintiff (R. 14, 2 5).
The plaintiff alleged:
""That the falling of said wheel was due to the
carelessness and negligence of the defendants in this:
(a) That the said defendant Lang Company carelessly and negligently fail~zd to fasten said tire or
secure the same when it loaded the same onto said
truck and carelessly and negligently failed to secure
said wheel in any manner whatsoever, then and there
well knowing that said wheel, by reason of not being
fastened or attached or secured in some manner,
would fall from ·said truck." (R. 14, 15).
The foregoing allegations were not denied by the de. .
fendants Livestock Company and the two Clawsons (R. 25).
Hence the negligence of the Lang Company and the
"fact that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries was not a controverted issue in the case. These
matters were alleged as true by plaintiff and w•ere oonoeded
by the defendants and the trial court found in accordance
with those pleadings.
We submit that plaintiff can not now claim that the
c~urt's findings are unsupported by the record.
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Th~

only case cited by plaintiff which is in any way
comparable to the case at bar is the case of &u.ghn v. Platt,
123 Texas 486, 72 S.W. 2d 580. In that case the court
stated:
'"In other words, w~ think it cannot be said that
the servant of the loz Company ought to have anticipated or foreseen that his act would result in plaintiff's injuries.,
However, in the case at bar, plaintiff alleged that the
defendant Lang Company knew that. said wheel, by p;::ason
of not being fastened or attached or secured in some manner,
would fall from the truck (quotation ·supra) . The trial
court so found (Finding No. 4, R. 47).
In the case at bar there are the additlional facts that the
Lang Company improperly loaded the truck in the first
instance and it then became necessary to return and have it
reloaded. Certainly from this it is obvious that the truck
was to be again taken out an the highway, and in loading
the wheel without fastening or securing it in some way,
it is reasonable to hold that the person loading it is charge·
able with anticipating that the tire would fall from the truck
(l)S it proo~eded along the highway.
That negligence of
Lang Company cannot be eliminated as a causative factor
in this case. That the negligence of Clawson concurred in
plaintiff's injuries does not eliminate this negligence. The
negligence of Clawson cannot bz classed as unrelated. The
tire fell from the truck and where it was not in any way
fastened that fall could be anticipated by the loader.
Plaintiff's contention that the negligence of the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
that the defendants in this case a11e joint tort j.eas1ors and that
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for only $1,780.00 against
the defendants _Livestock Company and the two Clawsons,
that amount, plus the $1,250 paid to him by Lang Company
being full compensation to hiin for the damages he has suffered by 11eason of his injuries.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS & ROBERTS

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents Leonard
Chipman Livestock
Company, JulionQlawson, Sr., Julian Clawson, Jr.
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